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Disease outbreaks in U.S. animal livestock industries have economic impacts measured
in hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Biosecurity, or procedures intended to protect
animals against disease, is known to be effective at reducing infection risk at facilities.
Yet, to the detriment of animal health, humans do not always follow biosecurity protocols.
Human behavioral factors have been shown to influence willingness to follow biosecurity
protocols. Here we show how social cues may affect cooperation with a biosecurity
practice. Participants were immersed in a simulated swine production facility through
a graphical user interface and prompted to make a decision that addressed their
willingness to comply with a biosecurity practice. We tested the effect of varying three
experimental variables: (1) the risk of acquiring an infection, (2) the delivery method of the
infection risk information (numerical vs. graphical), and (3) the behavior of an automated
coworker in the facility. We provide evidence that participants changed their behavior
when they observed a simulated worker making a choice to follow or not follow a
biosecurity protocol, even though the simulated worker had no economic effect on the
participants’ payouts. These results advance the understanding of human behavioral
effects on biosecurity protocol decisions, demonstrating that social cues need to be
considered by livestock facility managers when developing policies to make agricultural
systems more disease resilient.
Keywords: biosecurity, risk, compliance, social cue, psychological distance

1. INTRODUCTION
Endemic and emergent diseases remain a constant threat to the animal and economic welfare of
the livestock industry. A national survey of U.S. hog producers found that from 2014 to 2017,
54.3% reported having suffered an outbreak of Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
virus (PRRSv) and 43.9% reported experiencing an outbreak of Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus
(PEDv) (1). Annual economic losses due to PRRSv and PEDv are estimated at $580.62 million (2)
and upwards of $900 million (3), respectively. Animal health issues become even more pronounced
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to as temporally based psychological distancing, the farther
in the past an event occurs, the less likely and impactful
such an event is perceived to be. Pressure to complete work
efficiently with time constraints has created scenarios where
workers find it unrealistically challenging to complete their
job while complying with biosecurity standards (19). A better
understanding of the complex human decision-making process
that influences workers’ willingness to comply with biosecurity
protocols requires innovative research approaches and datacollection techniques that can provide novel feedback for tacticaland strategic-level decision makers.
Studies of human behavioral strategies have applied serious
games developed for data collection or education since as early
as 1962, when Toda approached the topic through designing
robot mining simulations (20). Experimental economic games
are a particular type of serious game in which participants
are incentivized with monetary payouts. Performance-based
incentives are known to increase engagement and salience in
decision-making (21–23). Indeed, Holt & Laury found in their
multiple price lottery experiment that risk aversion increased
when human subjects were presented with real financial
incentives (24). Computer-based simulations provide a unique
opportunity to study the mechanics of decision-making in a
controlled environment (25). Experiments utilizing computer
software have had success amongst adolescents, increasing
empathy (26) and also awareness of substance use (27). Within
the domain of animal biosecurity, serious games have explored
the effects of information awareness and audience on tactical
investments (28, 29) and also the effects of message delivery
method on operational compliance (30).
Recent research conducted by Merrill et al. (30) utilized
an experimental simulation of a livestock production facility
to examine factors that may influence perception of disease
risk, thus affecting biosecurity compliance. Their experimental
treatment variables included: information regarding disease
infection risk, uncertainty associated with disease infection
risk information, and the message delivery method used to
communicate disease infection risk. These factors have been
identified as important within the farmer biosecurity decisionmaking process (7, 31). Research has suggested that farmers
in the United States exhibit risk tolerance (32) but that they
may be more likely to implement or comply with biosecurity
as their perceived risk of infection increases (6, 28, 33). Indeed,
Merrill et al. (30) found that as the actual infection risk within
the experimental simulation increased, so did compliance with a
biosecurity practice. The certainty of infection risk information
is also expected to affect biosecurity implementation and
compliance (6), although the effect may change depending on the
domain of interest, i.e. tactical vs. operational. Merrill et al. (28)
found that in a tactical experimental simulation of disease in a
swine production region, an increase in disease risk certainty was
associated with increased biosecurity implementation. However,
in an operational experimental simulation of a single livestock
production facility, an increase in certainty was associated with
decreased biosecurity compliance (30). The opposite responses to
increases in disease risk certainty at the tactical and operational
levels highlight the complexity of human behavior and the need

considering the current threat of African swine fever, a highly
virulent disease that can cause up to 100% fatality in pigs (4).
Furthermore, analysis of consumer preferences indicates that
animal welfare is an important attribute to some consumers of
livestock products (5). During disease outbreaks, public concerns
related to food safety can cause reductions in pork consumption,
which has economic ramifications for the swine industry.
Implementation of biosecurity best management organizational
policies is critical for effectively preventing or controlling
outbreaks of existing and emerging virulent diseases (6).
Human behavioral factors that can influence biosecurity
implementation have been identified as crucial to mitigating
the risk of outbreaks, although limited knowledge exists on
the actual relationship between these factors and behavior
(7, 8). Analysis of human behavior can be undertaken in
contexts of varying scope: strategic, tactical, and operational
(9). Taking a broad view, big picture strategic decisions
are guided by long-term objectives. Biosecurity issues at the
strategic scale are often related to network interactions of
facilities and service providers across production chains. The
emergent behavior of networks, an important consideration of
strategic policymakers, is intrinsically related to more localized
tactical decisions that are made within a specified region.
At the tactical level, farm managers decide whether or not
to invest in and implement preventive biosecurity protocols.
From a narrower, more localized perspective, operationallevel biosecurity can be viewed as a continuous series
of decisions made by production workers indicating their
willingness to follow or comply with biosecurity protocols
(hereafter referred to as compliance with biosecurity) (10).
The operational, tactical, and strategic levels of biosecurity are
interconnected; for example, tactical decision-making influences
operational-level protocols. Moreover, while it is known that
operational-level compliance with biosecurity will impact the
implementation and efficacy of tactical and strategic biosecurity
decisions, limited feedback describing operational-level behavior
is currently available to inform tactical- and strategic-level
decision-making.
Compliance with biosecurity, such as consistently following
sanitation protocols before entering a production facility,
has been reported to significantly reduce disease (11–13).
Unfortunately, poor compliance with biosecurity is an endemic
problem in many animal production systems. A detailed
questionnaire of 60 Swedish farrow-to-finish herds found that
particular biosecurity measures were applied for visitors in
more than half of farms, but that those same measures
were carried out by farmers and staff themselves on only
32% of farms (14). Hidden cameras at Quebec poultry farms
documented 44 different biosecurity lapses made by workers
and visitors over a 4-week period (15). Workers may be
exposed to a variety of information about the consequences
of a facility infection, but they balance the cost of infection
with complacency and a tendency to become lax in day-today activities. This relaxation of biosecurity effort has been
examined from a temporal perspective, with evidence suggesting
that people view the likelihood and impact of an event to be
reduced as time since the event increases (16–18). Referred
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to provide operational feedback to tactical and strategic decision
makers that is currently unavailable.
Another factor that is expected to impact compliance with
biosecurity protocols is the message delivery method when
communicating disease risk level (34). The method of delivering
a message is important because humans exhibit affective
reasoning: feelings and initial reaction to stimuli guide decisionmaking (35, 36). Additionally, messaging affects the balance
of experiential and analytical reasoning in the processing of
statistical information (37). Humans rely on a limited number
of mental heuristics, or ways to reduce problem complexity,
when presented with decisions under uncertainty (38). Visual
or graphical communication of risk can be advantageous in
attracting and holding attention (34). Indeed, Merrill et al. (30)
found that risk information delivered in a graphical format was
more effective in increasing biosecurity compliance with respect
to messages delivered in a numeric or linguistic format.
Contextual and situational factors also determine how
probability is understood (39, 40). Generally, humans
underestimate risks that occur frequently (41) and discount
the risk of an event if the probability is low (42). However, the
exact definition of low is malleable and subjective, as it can change
depending on context. Humans utilize mental shortcuts when
making decisions with limited time. One such common heuristic
is referred to as anchoring and adjustment (38). The following
example illustrates how the formulation of a problem can
profoundly impact the final answer. When two groups of high
school students were asked to estimate a numerical expression
within 5 s (seconds), they used extrapolation and adjustment
to formulate their answer under time pressure. The first group,
when asked to estimate 1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8 yielded a
median estimate of 512; while the second group, presented with
the expression 8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 yielded a median
estimate of 2,250 (38). Although the correct answer is 40,320
in both cases, changing the initial point of reference completely
alters the result of the off-hand mental calculation.
In this study we expand upon the work of Merrill et al.
(30) by introducing a novel variable as a treatment: information
about social cues in a production facility. Response to social
cues is grounded in social value orientation, the weights given
by an individual to their own welfare and to the welfare of
their interaction partner in evaluation of the desirability of a
particular outcome. Predicting behavior is challenging when
the same social cue can be interpreted as an incentive or a
deterrent. Individuals who assign positive weights to partners’
welfare are classified as pro-social. Those who assign negative
value or do not assign any value to their partners’ welfare are
characterized as pro-selves. Where pro-social individuals can
interpret a behavior as a reflection of good intentions, pro-self
individuals value only their own welfare and may interpret the
same behavior from an interaction partner differently, as a sign
of weakness (43). Variability in the internal logic and activities
that motivate farmers in particular makes a “one-size-fits-all”
strategy impossible (44). Previous work has shown the potential
for social cues to contribute to behavioral flexibility, influencing
the way individuals react to their environments. Performancebased imitation, copying actions of those who are seen to do
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well, is an observed phenomenon known as social sampling (45).
Social cues within a computer-simulated maze experiment were
seen to dramatically increase the adoption of novel behavior
patterns (46). Research describing changes in operational-level
biosecurity compliance behavior as a result of social cues is not
currently available. Identifying that social cues have an effect on
operational biosecurity compliance could aid decision makers at
the tactical and strategic levels as they seek to increase compliance
with protocols.
We developed a novel experiment based on the framework
of the serious game designed by Merrill et al. (30), in which
participants were confronted with a compliance decision related
to a common biosecurity practice, usually referred to as
showering in-and-out. The shower-in, shower-out biosecurity
practice, a component of the line of separation biosecurity
protocol, involves changing clothes and showering before
entering or exiting areas with livestock to reduce transmission
of disease between animals within a facility and the outside
environment. The practice is known to be highly effective at
reducing the risk of infection (11). However, workers may
neglect, avoid, or insufficiently complete the practice due to the
time it takes to use it (19). For example, effectively showering
multiple times a day is time-consuming and may be perceived
to have negative repercussions such as damaging one’s hair and
skin or inhibiting completion of daily tasks. We developed novel
experimental scenarios that tested participants’ willingness to
comply with the shower biosecurity practice. Specifically, we
placed individuals into a farming situation where they were asked
to make a binary biosecurity decision. Here we hypothesize (H1)
that when provided with a social cue, in this case the biosecurity
behavior of a coworker, individuals may react by mimicking or
doing the opposite of the cue but, regardless, are more likely to
change their behavior in response to the cue, than if they did not
receive the cue.
Experimental variables manipulated the following factors: (1)
the risk of acquiring an infection, (2) the delivery method of the
infection risk, and (3) the behavior of an automated coworker in
the facility. In addition to the three primary drivers of behavior,
infection risk, message delivery method, and social cue, we also
looked for an additional secondary driver of behavior, temporally
based psychological distancing. While we expect that participants
will increase compliance in response to an infection event, this
tendency to comply is likely to decrease as time passes (16, 18, 42).
Referred to as a psychological distance effect, Merrill et al. (30)
found that compliance did increase directly after an infection,
but that the effect decreased with time after the infection.
We hypothesized (H2) that compliance would increase directly
after an infection event and that temporally based psychological
distancing would occur, defined as a decrease in compliance with
increasing time since an infection.

2. METHODS
2.1. Deployment
We conducted a single experiment to examine human behavioral
responses to social cues in a simulated production facility
(Figure 1). Participants were recruited using the online
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attending to this outside task was based on the time it took to
accomplish, starting at $30 experimental dollars and decreasing
by $1 experimental dollar per second. To earn the experimental
dollars for completing this high-value task, participants chose
to comply and use the shower biosecurity practice, which
required extra time both exiting and entering the facility (with
an approximate observed cost of $8.67 experimental dollars), or
to avoid compliance by using the emergency exit, which carried
no associated time costs but risked infection of the facility’s swine.
More specifically, across all treatments, participants were
asked to leave the facility to complete an outside task and were
confronted with the decision of how to leave the facility, either
by complying with the biosecurity practice or by skipping the
practice and leaving through the emergency exit. If participants
decided to use the shower biosecurity practice and “comply,”
this activated a 5 s counter that simulated the time it takes
to shower and change clothes. After 5 s, the virtual worker
could exit the shower and complete the outside task. The same
procedure, with another 5 s delay, was repeated upon re-entry of
the facility post-task completion. If the participant decided on
non-compliance with the shower biosecurity practice and thus
left the facility through the emergency exit, they incurred no
time cost, but there was an associated chance of infection based
on the actual infection risk probability during the given round.
The risk of using the emergency exit was quantified using the
infection information presented to the participant, which varied
by treatment (see Table 1 for a breakdown of the information
provided to participants by experimental variable and associated
treatment levels). If an infection occurred, calculated using a
pseudorandom number generator, the round ended immediately,
and the participant lost $50 experimental dollars as well as any
expected payout they had collected during the round. If an
infection did not occur, the round continued until the normal end
of the workday. The mean observed opportunity cost of using the
shower practice as opposed to the emergency exit was calculated
to be $8.67 experimental dollars due to the time lost that could
have been used to complete the outside task more quickly and
collect coins inside the facility upon reentry.
In addition to the participant’s worker, an automated
coworker was included in all simulation scenarios to provide
implicit social cues to the player. The only explicit information
given to the participants regarding the coworker was during
the pre-game slide show (see Supplementary Materials), where
they read that there may be another worker in the facility with
them. The automated coworker was completely predetermined
in it’s actions, exhibiting one of three behaviors in any given
round: (1) compliance with the shower biosecurity practice, (2)
use of the emergency exit, or (3) not exiting the facility (Control).
Participants were not informed whether the coworker’s noncompliance behavior could lead to an infection (it could
not). During the coworker compliance and non-compliance
treatments, participants would see the decision made by the
coworker before they made their own decision to use the shower
biosecurity practice or the emergency exit. This demonstration by
the coworker, an implicit social cue, was intended to be observed
by the participant and to have the potential to affect their decision
to comply.

FIGURE 1 | Screenshot of a game round showing infection risk delivered as a
numerical (Numeric) message, the participant-controlled worker, automated
coworker, coins (internal tasks), the shower biosecurity practice (blue arrow)
and emergency exit (red arrow).

workplace Amazon Mechanical Turk, which has been identified
as a representative sample for the U.S. population (47) and a
viable alternative to traditional data collection (48). Recruits
were informed that their pay would be based on performance
during the experiment. Before the experiment commenced, an
informational slideshow (see Supplementary Materials) was
displayed explaining the purpose of the study and the mechanics
of the game. This was followed by a screen allowing the recruit
to choose between proceeding to play the game or declining to
participate. Institutional Review Board approved practices for an
experiment using human participants were followed (University
of Vermont IRB # CHRBSS-16-232-IRB).

2.2. Experiment Design
The simulated pork production facility was built using the Unity
Development Platform (Unity Technologies, Version 5.6.3) and
hosted online using WebGL (49). Each participant acted as
a worker and was provided with information in the form
of treatments that differed by combination of experimental
variables: the risk of infection if they chose not to comply, the
delivery method of the infection risk message, and the behavior of
a coworker present with them in the simulated facility. With the
treatment information provided, participants were confronted
with a choice to either use the shower biosecurity practice or
bypass the practice to avoid costs associated with usage of the
practice. Each round lasting up to 70 s represented one work day,
9 a.m. to 6 p.m. The experiment began with one practice round,
and this was followed by 18 rounds of incentivized play.
To act as a worker in the facility, the participant used the
computer keyboard. Each round, the worker began inside the
facility. Tasks, represented as spinning coins, appeared every 2
s. When the participant moved their worker to a coin, they
earned $1 experimental dollar. Once during each round, a highvalue task would appear outside the virtual facility. The value for

Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org

4

March 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 130

Trinity et al.

Social Cue Effects on Compliance

After each round, the number of experimental dollars earned
within the round was displayed on the participant’s screen. In
addition, a cumulative sum of the total experimental dollars
earned thus far in the experiment was displayed. At the end of
the 18 experimental rounds, participants received $1 U.S. for each
$350 experimental dollars plus a base pay of $3.00 U.S.

TABLE 1 | Experiment treatments.
Treatment

2.3. Experimental Variables and Treatments
The experimental variables were designed to test factors shown
to influence human behavior: risk of infection, message delivery
method, and social cue. Participants were confronted with
infection risk, delivered in different message formats, at the
start of each round. This infection risk information was used
by the participant during the round when they chose to either
comply with the shower biosecurity protocol or risk using the
emergency exit for a slightly higher payout. The infection risk
information was delivered numerically (e.g., “5% infection risk”)
or graphically using a threat gauge (Figure 2).
In the original work of Merrill et al. (30), the certainty of
the disease risk information and the message delivery method
were treated as separate variables. When disease infection risk
was treated with certainty, participants were provided with a
single infection probability. Disease infection risk was treated
with uncertainty by providing a best estimate of the infection
probability in addition to a range of potential values. It was
determined that numerical values with certainty were the most
likely to be associated with avoidance of the biosecurity practice
and that graphical threat gauge style images with uncertainty were
the best at increasing willingness to comply (30). In order to
increase our sample size per treatment, we utilized only these
two types of message delivery methods: numeric with certainty,
and graphical with uncertainty, respectively. Hereafter, these are
referred to as Numeric and Graphical.
For our novel social cue experimental variable, an automated
coworker demonstrated one of three behaviors prior to
the participant’s decision to comply. Unbeknownst to the
participant, the compliance decision chosen by the coworker
was predetermined by treatment. Coworker demonstration of
compliance involved the automated coworker using the shower
biosecurity practice; likewise, the coworker demonstration of
non-compliance involved the coworker using the emergency
exit. No demonstration, the control treatment, indicates that the
coworker never left the facility.
In summary, the experiment had three infection risk
treatments: (very low (1%), low (5%), medium (15%)), two
infection risk messaging treatments (Numeric and Graphical),
and three social cue treatments (Compliance by Coworker, NonCompliance by Coworker, and Coworker Control). A complete
block design was utilized, in which data were collected for
every combination of the three experimental variables and their
associated levels. Two additional variables were also used in
this experiment. First, the psychological distance effect was
considered in order to identify changes in behavior related
to experiencing infection events. The distancing effect was
quantified by a default value of 18 (total number of rounds in a
session), with the value being set to 0 if an infection occurred,
and then increasing by 1 each round after an infection. This
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N

Infection Risk: 1% (Very Low)

648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)

Infection Risk: 5% (Low)

648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)

Infection Risk: 15% (Medium)

648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)

Message Delivery Method:
Numeric (“1%,” “5%,” or “15%”)

972 (9 rounds * 108 participants)

Message Delivery Method:
Graphical (A threat gauge with
arrows used to indicate risk)

972 (9 rounds * 108 participants)

Social Cue:
Compliance by Coworker

648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)

Social Cue:
Non-Compliance by Coworker

648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)

Social Cue:
Coworker Control

648 (6 rounds * 108 participants)

quantity is normalized between 0 and 1 for analysis. Second,
because the experiment takes place in a series of rounds, we
used a variable referred to as play order to control for withinexperiment learning (50). The play order variable is associated
with each round within an experiment, identifying the order in
which they were played. In this case, the single variable play
order subsumes the numerous potential strategy shifts that may
occur as the game proceeds, including potential learning effects
or increases in loss aversion.

2.4. Analysis
2.4.1. Logistic Regression
The response variable in our experiment is binary: the
participant either used the shower biosecurity practice or avoided
compliance by using the emergency exit. To explain the response
variable, a set of mixed-effect logistic regression candidate models
were generated using the statistical programming language,
R (51–53). The set of candidate models included mixtures
of experimental variables (Table 1), interaction terms between
experimental variables, as well as predictor variables: (1)
psychological distance, and (2) play order. Participant was added
as a random effect in all models to account for variation
between individuals. To identify the model of best fit, we used
an information-theoretic approach to test how well each of
our candidate models explains the data (54, 55). Models were
evaluated using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), where the
lowest AIC value indicates the most parsimonious candidate
model that best explains variation in the response variable with
the fewest parameterized variables (56).

2.4.2. Ratio of Variances
Nonlinear effects resulting from inconsistent responses to the
social cue experimental variable are identified in a separate
examination of the strategy variance components. Here we
quantify strategic variability by calculating how an individual
changed their compliance strategy between the three social
cue treatments: compliance, non-compliance, and control. Due
to our complete block experiment design, we can isolate an
individual’s average compliance in response to any one of
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FIGURE 2 | Start-of-round infection risk delivered as a graphical (Graphical) message; two arrows, one fixed, the other moving, were used to convey a best estimate
and uncertainty around that estimate (A). Start-of-round infection risk delivered as a numerical (Numeric) message (B).

included in the AIC-selected best candidate model. Interaction
effects between experimental variables were not found to be
significant in any of the candidate models generated.
The models use a linear combination of the random and
fixed effects to obtain logit coefficients that predict the response
variable or the probability (from 0 to 1) that the participant would
comply with the shower biosecurity practice. We exponentiated
the logit coefficients to generate odds ratios, which were used to
evaluate the odds that an individual will opt to use the shower
biosecurity practice as opposed to the emergency exit. Odds
ratios that were greater than 1 indicated that it was significantly
more likely that the participant would comply with the shower
practice than that they would use the emergency exit; ratios below
1 indicated it was more likely the participant would use the
emergency exit.
Results from the logistic regression quantify the modelpredicted probability that the participant will comply with the
shower biosecurity practice. Presented as odds ratios in Table 3,
the first row (intercept) represents the odds of using the shower
biosecurity practice as opposed to the emergency exit among the
baseline group associated with the treatment combination of 5%
infection risk delivered using a Graphical message. The 66.536
odds (intercept) signifies that participants are 66.536 times as
likely to use the shower biosecurity practice as opposed to the
emergency exit when provided with the Graphical message at the
5% infection risk level. The odds ratios in Table 3 are compared
to the baseline group (intercept). For example, participants that
received the infection risk information as a Numeric message as
opposed to the intercept message delivery method (Graphical)
had an odds ratio of 0.095. Therefore, participants receiving
a Numeric message were 0.095 times as likely to use the
shower biosecurity practice, or 10.526 times as likely to use the
emergency exit, than participants receiving a Graphical message.
We found significant main effects (Table 3, Figure 3).

our three social cue treatments by averaging over the other
two experimental variables: infection risk and message delivery
method. Having identified an individual’s average compliance
strategy for each of the three social cue treatments they were
presented, we then calculate the differences in strategy between
each of the three pairs of social cue treatments (compliance
vs. non-compliance, compliance vs. control, non-compliance vs.
control), for example, how an individual’s average compliance
changed between all rounds in which they were presented with
the social cue compliance treatment, vs. all rounds where they
were presented with the social cue non-compliance treatment.
The psychological distance effect was distributed uniformly
between the three pairs of social cue treatments due to
stochasticity in both treatment play order and infection events
and was therefore not included as a factor in this analysis (see
Supplementary Materials).
After quantifying individuals’ strategic variability using
changes in average compliance, we can aggregate all participants’
average compliance changes into distributions, grouped by the
pairs of social cue treatments between which individuals may
have collectively changed their average behavior. The variance
of each of the three distributions can be evaluated in relation
to one another as ratios of variances, which quantify differences
in strategic variability observed over all individuals. Confidence
intervals were calculated using an F-test to determine if any of
the ratios of variances are statistically significant.

3. RESULTS
Data were collected from 108 participants for the experiment.
The average payout was $5.62 U.S., with a minimum of $4.32 U.S.
and a maximum of $6.45 U.S. From the set of mixed-effect logistic
regression candidate models, the model with the lowest AIC,
Model 1, was selected as the best-supported candidate model
and used for reported statistical inference from the experiment
(Table 2). Model 1 included the fixed effects psychological
distance, message delivery method, infection risk, and play order,
in addition to participant as a random effect. 1AIC quantifies the
loss of information if a different candidate model is used. Neither
the social cue experimental variable nor interaction effects were
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3.1. Main Effects
Average compliance increased with increasing infection risk
from 1% (34% compliance) to 5% (60% compliance) to 15%
(89% compliance) (Figure 3, Left Panel). Compliance was also
much higher when the infection risk message was delivered as
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TABLE 2 | Candidate models reordered by AIC value, with the best AIC-selected models listed first.
Model

PD

M

IR

PO

1

X

X

X

X

3

X

X

X

X

SC

2

X

X

X

X

X

7

X

X

X

X

X

4

X

X

X

X

5

X

X

X

X

6

X

X

X

X

M*IR

M*SC

SC*IR

AIC

1AIC

1495

0

X

1495

0.280

1498

3.081

X

1499

3.383

X

X

X

1502

6.764

X

1505

10.195

X

1506

10.523

Independent variables: Psychological Distance (PD), Message Delivery Method (M), Infection Risk (IR), Play Order (PO), and Social Cue (SC). Interaction terms, e.g., Message Delivery
Method by Infection Risk, are denoted as (M*IR).

TABLE 3 | Results of the selected best fit mixed-effect logistic regression model (Model 1; see Table 2).
Parameter

Odds ratio

Lower bound

Upper bound

Intercept (Graphical Message, Infection Risk @ 5%)

66.536

22.729

194.774

<0.001

Psychological Distance

0.120

0.048

0.299

<0.001
<0.001

P-value

Numeric Message

0.095

0.068

0.134

Infection Risk @ 15%

20.100

12.885

31.353

<0.001

Infection Risk @ 1%

0.116

0.081

0.165

<0.001

Play Order

0.976

0.949

1.004

0.090

Depicted here are the odds ratios for fixed effects describing relationships with the binary response variable: compliance with the biosecurity practice. Bold values indicate significance
at α = 0.05.

response. The social cue variable was not included in the
AIC-selected best candidate model (Table 2). This indicated
that individuals did not respond in a consistent or linear
way to the coworker demonstrations, so the information
gained by including the social cue variable did not explain
enough information to overcome the penalty for the inclusion
of an additional parameterized variable. While the changes
in compliance were not consistent across participants, we
sought to discover whether the coworker behavior influenced
the strategies used by the participants. We identified the
strategic variability of individuals by quantifying their change
in average compliance when confronted by the different
coworker behaviors. Controlling for the effects of the infection
risk and message delivery method experimental variables, we
calculate individual changes in average compliance between the
three social cue treatments: Compliance by Coworker, NonCompliance by Coworker, and Coworker Control. Specifically,
we identify the distributions of average changes in compliance
between the three combinations of these treatments: Compliance
by Coworker vs. Non-Compliance by Coworker, Compliance
by Coworker vs. Coworker Control, and Non-Compliance by
Coworker vs. Coworker Control (Figure 4). This allowed us
to test whether the strategy space was distributed differently
between the social cue treatments.
Change in average compliance, normalized to span from −1
to 1, represented the degree to which an individual changed
their compliance strategy between two types of social cue
treatments. Of particular interest was whether participants
altered their strategies when observing a coworker exiting

FIGURE 3 | Summary results of the main treatment effects. Box plot of the
probability of using the shower biosecurity practice by the main effects,
Infection Risk and Message Delivery Method. Lower and upper box
boundaries are 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively, line inside box is the
median, and overlaid on model-predicted data values.

a Graphical message (73% compliance) vs. as a Numeric message
(49% compliance) (Figure 3, Right Panel), which was also found
in the experiment by Merrill et al. (30).

3.2. Individual Differences (H1)
Strategic variability of individual behavior was quantified to
determine if the coworker social cues elicited any measurable
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FIGURE 4 | Violin plots with inlaid box-plots of individuals’ changes in average compliance between coworker treatments. Lower and upper box boundaries are the
25th and 75th percentiles, respectively, and the line inside the box is the median.

the production facility (either following protocols or not) as
contrasted with the strategies they employed when the coworker
never left the facility. The greatest strategic variability was
observed in the changes of compliance between Compliance
by Coworker treatments and Non-Compliance by Coworker
treatments (Figure 4, Leftmost violin plot with inlaid box-plot).
In this case, participants with a positive change in compliance
(e.g., increasing compliance from a base rate), falling above
the y=0 line, were complying with the shower biosecurity
practice more often during Compliance by Coworker treatments
compared with Non-Compliance by Coworker treatments.
However, there were also individuals doing the opposite;
participants falling below the y = 0 line were complying
more often during Non-Compliance by Coworker treatments
compared with Compliance by Coworker treatments. To evaluate
the relative change in variance between the three distributions of
compliance strategies (Figure 4), we enumerated their ratios of
variances (Table 4).
To determine if any of the ratios of variances were statistically
significant, confidence intervals were calculated using an F-test
(Table 5). The top two rows of Table 5 with significant p-values
correspond to the increased variation in individual compliance
strategies observed between the two explicit demonstrations
(Compliance by Coworker vs. Non-Compliance by Coworker)
with respect to compliance strategy variation between either
of the two explicit demonstrations and the baseline treatment
(Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control or NonCompliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control). This confirmed
the hypothesis (H1) that participants would change their
behavior using the social cues presented to them. In this case,
the change in behavior came in the form of increased strategic
variability between either of the two explicit social cues with
respect to the control. The third row of Table 5 indicates there
was not a significant difference in strategic variability between

Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org

TABLE 4 | Variance of changes in average compliance between the three
combinations of social cue treatments.
Ratio of variances
Compliance by
Coworker vs.
Non-Compliance by
Coworker

0.040

1.496

1.680

Compliance by
Coworker vs. Coworker
Control

0.027

1

1.123

0.027

0.024

Compliance by
Coworker vs.
Coworker Control

Non-Compliance
by Coworker vs.
Coworker Control

Variance

Ratios of variances quantify the relative change in variance between two distributions.

Compliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control and NonCompliance by Coworker vs. Coworker Control.

3.3. Psychological Distance (H2)
The results of the AIC-selected best-fitting model from the
experiment found the psychological distance effect to be
significant, with an odds ratio of 0.120 (Table 3). This confirms
(H2) that temporally based psychological distancing occurred
by indicating that the probability that individuals would comply
with the shower biosecurity practice increased directly after
becoming infected and that the effect decayed with time.

4. DISCUSSION
The goal of our experiment was to investigate the effects
of social cues in a simulated pork production facility. Our
study advances knowledge of how heuristics (38), or affective
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TABLE 5 | Results of F-test to calculate ratio of variances (Table 4) confidence intervals.
Paired social cue treatment ratio

Ratio of variances

Lower bound

Upper bound

P-value

(SC1 vs. SC2) / (SC1 vs. Control)

1.496

1.022

2.190

0.038

(SC1 vs. SC2) / (SC2 vs. Control)

1.680

1.148

2.459

0.008

(SC1 vs. Control) / (SC2 vs. Control)

1.123

0.767

1.643

0.550

SC1 corresponds with Compliance by Coworker treatments, SC2 corresponds with Non-Compliance by Coworker treatments, Control corresponds with Coworker Control treatments.
Bold indicates statistical significance, α = 0.05.

reasoning (35, 36), may impact decisions made under time
pressure. We examined the effects of introducing social
cues by testing for disease infection risk, message delivery
method, and social cues. Our results unveil the potential
impacts of social value orientation (43) by identifying the
effects of different social cues at the operational level of
biosecurity. Social cues were shown to have a significant
effect on the degree of strategic variability in compliance
behavior (H1). That is, people reacted and changed their
behavior when they observed the coworker’s biosecurity decision
as compared to when the coworker stayed in the facility
for the entire working day. We also found evidence of a
psychological distance effect (H2), an increased likelihood to
comply directly after an infection event, an effect that decayed
over time.

facility layout design strategies that can motivate compliance
of workers?

4.2. Limitations
Statistical sampling methods are often used to study selected
groups and strata of society, but they do carry the potential to
introduce bias into an experiment when the sampled population
has marked differences from the target population. For our
study, we assume that results obtained using the online platform
Amazon Mechanical Turk can be extrapolated to the target
population of swine industry professionals. Amazon Mechanical
Turk has been identified as a viable alternative to traditional
sampling methods like surveys (48) and is also characterized as
a more representative sample of the U.S. national population
than either college undergraduate or internet samples in general
(47). Limited research currently exists to compare the differences
between swine industry workers and the general population,
although a recent study did aim to contrast the behavior of
agricultural professionals and a sample of online participants.
Clark et al. (29) did not detect a difference in the distributions of
risk-behavioral strategies between a sample of online participants
and agricultural professionals, including business owners and
animal health experts. Farmers in particular exhibit variable
responses to stimuli due to the complexity of the decision-making
process (44), and, because they are operating under a variety of
different objective functions, a consistent bias is unlikely. Despite
this, the lack of context and experience in our sample population,
which is likely to have an influence on risk perceptions and
compliance with biosecurity for actual professionals in the swine
industry, remains the main limitation of our study.
Work by Merrill et al. (30), specifically their second
experiment, was the foundation for the experiment within the
current study. It is important to acknowledge the differences
in the current experiment, both to enhance replicability and to
address any potential bias in comparison. The differences in
the current experiment compared to the work of Merrill et al.
(30) were that the linguistic message delivery treatment was
removed, the social cue experimental variable was introduced, the
appearance of the threat gauge was adjusted, the experiment had
six fewer rounds, and each round was approximately 10 s longer.
Although the appearance of the threat gauge was modified, the
relatively consistent use of verbal demarcations (Low, Medium,
High), should preserve response to the graphical message across
experiments. Finally, for the analysis in this work, the effects
of the message delivery method and information certainty were
not separated, as they were combined within single treatment
variables to increase the sample size. Specifically, Numeric refers

4.1. Cultural Context
Informal and situated practices in agricultural work, including
social circumstances, are often not accounted for in biosecurity
protocols (57). To have a positive impact on farm culture
in the long term, it is important to understand that the
biosecurity compliance behavior of individuals does not exist
in a vacuum. The behavior of workers develops within a
complex farm culture that arises as a result of interactions
between workers, animals, and their material surroundings.
As a result of the variety of factors affecting decisionmaking, changing workers’ attitudes alone may fail to lead
to a long-term positive change in culture (58). By simulating
a small subset of the interactions that take place within
a farm, we provide a novel experimental setting for the
study of socialization and experience-based learning. This
mechanism can provide insight into the basic interactions
that cumulatively compose farm culture, with the goal of
identifying cues or structures that can be leveraged to motivate
positive behaviors.
Overcoming the built-in inertia of existing feedback loops in
farms is a difficult problem. Certain “trigger events”, including
disease outbreaks or farm relocations, have been identified as
providing a window for behavioral change. In these situations,
farmers are more open to accessing new options and potentially
changing practices (59, 60). Additional research is needed
to determine how the effects of social cues change in light
of practices that are well established. We propose future
experiments that expand on our novel experimental setting with
the goal of inciting positive changes in farm culture in the long
term. How do social cues affect the compliance behavior of a
new worker on a farm vs. an experienced veteran? Are there
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TABLE 6 | Change in observed frequency of use of the shower biosecurity practice between original analogous treatments and current experiment treatments by
infection risk.
Infection risk

Merrill et al. frequency of compliance (%)

Current study frequency of compliance (%)

1 frequency of compliance (%)

1

23.6

33.6

10.0

5

56.0

60.3

4.3

15

80.9

88.7

7.8

Average

53.5

60.9

7.4

1 frequency of compliance quantifies the change between the original and current average compliance; positive values correspond to an increase in the current-study average
compliance.

This potential future work could discern some of these subtleties
of risk communication strategies and determine whether it
was the introduction of the social cue or the omission of
the high infection risk level that caused the observed increase
in compliance.

to the combined effects of numeric message delivery method
and information with certainty, while Graphical refers to the
combined effects of graphical message delivery and information
with uncertainty.

4.3. Infection Risk

4.4. Individual Differences (H1)

Infection risk has been determined to be the main driver of
behavior both in this current experiment and in the work
of Merrill et al. (30). In the study by Merrill et al. (30),
participants were exposed to infection risk treatments of very
low (1%), low (5%), medium (15%), and high (25%). In the
current experiment, the high infection risk treatment with a
25% chance of infection was omitted because Merrill et al.
(30) observed near-ubiquitous compliance at 25%, and we
wanted to increase our ability to detect differences in other
signals, such as the social cue experimental variable. Therefore,
participants were only confronted with the very low (1%), low
(5%), and medium (15%) infection risk treatments. The change
in risk perception that could be attributed to the removal of
the high infection risk treatment can be seen when comparing
average compliance in the current experiment with average
compliance in analogous treatments from the experiment of
Merrill et al. (30) (Table 6). Here analogous refers to message
delivery method treatments in the experiment conducted by
Merrill et al. (30) that were replicated in the current experiment,
numeric with certainty and graphical with uncertainty, omitting
message delivery method treatments that were not replicated,
e.g., numeric with uncertainty, from comparison.
In analogous treatments in the experiment of Merrill et al.
(30), average compliance increased from 23.6% at very low
infection risk to 56.0% at low risk to 80.9% at medium
risk to 91.0% at high risk. We found increased compliance
with the shower biosecurity practice in our experiment. In
the current study, average compliance increased from 33.6%
at very low infection risk to 60.3% at low infection risk to
88.7% at medium infection risk. By removing the high infection
risk treatment, participants may have exhibited increased risk
aversion in decision-making because they were now using the
medium infection risk treatment as their point of reference
for maximum infection risk. This effect of reframing infection
risk is consistent with heuristics identified in risk-perception
literature (38, 42). It is also possible that changes in observed
compliance between experiments could have been caused by
the introduction of the social cue experimental variable. We
propose an additional experiment that utilizes our novel social
cue experimental variable without omitting the 25% risk level.
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By introducing the social cue variable into the experiment design,
we hypothesized that compliance behavior could be shifted by
an implicit suggestion. Humans are known to let feelings and
mental shortcuts guide the decision-making process, especially
when under time pressure (35, 36, 38). In this case, the social cue
came from a coworker present in the facility with the participant.
We observed increased strategic variability by participants in
their response to compliance or non-compliance by the coworker
compared to the control where the coworker never exited.
Although the automated coworker had no effect on the actual
outcome of the round, we expected the subtle hint of how the
coworker handled the compliance decision to be internalized in
the decision-making process of participants. The behaviors of
the automated coworker could have changed how a participant
perceived what is commonly done in the facility. It is also possible
that participants could have interpreted their coworkers’ noncompliance as potentially leading to an infection. In this case,
they may have decided to comply based on the effects of riskaversion as opposed to what they perceived was commonly done
in the facility. While we cannot rule out that a portion of the
population acted in this manner, it was determined to be unlikely
that the majority of the population acted in this way, because
interaction effects between the social cue and infection risk
treatment were not found to be significant. If risk aversion due
to coworker non-compliance was having an effect, it would have
been much more pronounced at the 15% risk level than the 1%
risk level.
In our examination of the variability in the participants’
strategy space, we established that individuals displayed
significantly more variation in compliance strategy when
responding to two different explicit social behaviors: Compliance
by Coworker and Non-Compliance by Coworker. The social
value orientation of participants, associated with varying
tendencies to cooperate or compete with interaction partners,
likely played a role in observed differences in strategic variability
(43). These differences could also be attributed to a mirroring or
mimicry effect; imitation based on social performance cues has
been observed, although, in this experiment, there was no effect
on performance or payout related to the cue (45). This aligns
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with research identifying the impact of social cues on behavioral
flexibility, leading to novel behavioral patterns (46). Quantified
as variance, or ratio of variances, having a significant increase
indicates individuals were changing, but not in a consistent way.
One explanation is that individuals are known to be motivated
by a wide range of factors and internal logic (44). The complex
decision-making process in each individual may lead to varying
degrees of “follower” or “anti-follower” tendencies. If a worker
in a facility sees their associate breaking the rules, are they more
likely to pick up the slack and “cover for them,” or are they more
likely to feel it is justified for them to break the rules as well?
One player who shared their strategy after the experiment stated
they would always use the shower biosecurity practice when
the coworker was exiting the emergency door to compensate
for/offset their coworker’s bad behavior. They felt more inclined
to shower in order to protect the farm from disease.
Identifying that social cues influence compliance strategy at
the operational level is a novel conclusion and lends credence
and support to future studies of worker culture. We recommend
follow-up experiments with more explicit social cues, e.g.,
where a coworker demonstration is paired with an associated
explanation of behavior communicated via a text bubble. For
example, how would pairing the coworker demonstration of
compliance within this experiment with an explicit verbal
explanation from the coworker (e.g., “Showering takes time, but
we are all in this together.”) affect the behavior of participants?
Another avenue to further research the effects of social cues on
operational biosecurity compliance is to replicate the current
experiment in a virtual-reality based swine production facility
in order to test whether the results are consistent in a more
immersive environment. Continuing to study how social cues can
increase compliance or induce non-compliance will be valuable
for farm management, training, and monitoring.

the swine industry, understanding how social cues are affecting
compliance with existing biosecurity protocols is critical. This
study demonstrates the ability to test hypotheses about human
behavioral responses to social cues using experimental game
simulations. We examined how a coworker demonstration can
impact the complex mental process occurring when participants
chose to comply with the simulated shower biosecurity practice
in the experiment. We tested the effect of an implicit social cue
on decision-making; an attempt to subtly recreate the worker
culture in a facility (33). While it is well known that workers
do not always comply with operational-level protocols (15),
there is no existing data that shows how social cues may be
impacting these biosecurity lapses. These findings outline the
significant variability in how people change their behavior in
response to those around them, even when others’ actions have
no repercussions or effect on monetary payout.
To summarize, this work identifies that social cues will
result in different compliance strategies amongst individuals in
a simulated swine facility. The behavior of others, even if not
directly impacting the individual, will impact their decisionmaking. To extend these findings to be applicable at the facility
level, we propose that further studies among livestock producers
be conducted so that results can be compared and other
socio-demographic characteristics can be included. Providing
this feedback from the operational level can inform tactical
and strategic decision makers as they implement biosecurity
protocols whose efficacy will depend on workers’ willingness to
comply and attempt to create a workplace culture of compliance.
Humans are extremely complex, and while we acknowledge that
there is no blanket solution to increasing worker compliance,
we believe that small changes can have an impact on the
system level. Advancing knowledge and understanding of human
behavioral components of animal biosecurity has vast potential to
increase worker and animal welfare, shifting the industry toward
disease-resiliency.

4.5. Psychological Distance (H2)
In our experiment, individuals who had recently incurred a
facility infection were far more likely to comply with the shower
biosecurity practice. Over time, mental construals of events are
expected to become more abstract and low-level, decreasing
their influence on future decisions (17). In the context of
this experiment, the increased likelihood to comply directly
after an infection event wore off over time. This temporally
based psychological distancing (16, 18) was similarly observed
by Merrill et al. (30), where individuals who had just been
infected were twice as likely to comply as those who had never
been infected. Our results therefore suggest that it is important
to acknowledge that temporal psychological distancing will
influence workers, and the decrease in observed compliance
should be combatted, for example with biosecurity training that
is reinforced frequently.
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